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PARENT AND CHILD-INTERSTATE CUSTODY:
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT DECLINES
TO DECIDE WHETHER THE SIX-MONTH TEMPORARY
PRESENCE OF A CHILD IN NORTH DAKOTA IS SUFFICIENT
TO EXERCISE HOME STATE JURISDICTION
Wintz v. Crabtree, 1999 ND 85, 593 N.W.2d 355
i. FACTS
Sandra Jean Wintz (Sandra) and William Jim Crabtree (Bill) were
married in Denmark1 in 1984.2 Two children were born to this mar-
riage, 3 Nadia 4 and William.5 The couple lived in Germany where Bill
served in the military. 6 The couple eventually separated and signed an
agreement stipulating how their assets would be divided and establishing
custody of the children. 7
Sandra retained sole care, custody, and control of the children after
the separation. 8 Sandra and the children returned to the United States
1. See Appellant's Brief, app. at 15, 27, Wintz v. Crabtree, 1999 ND 85, 593 N.W.2d 355 (No.
980244).
2. See Wintz, 2, 593 N.W.2d at 356.
3. See id.
4. See id. Nadia was born August 4, 1986. See Appellant's Brief, app. at 25, Wintz (No.
980244).
5. See Wintz, 2, 593 N.W.2d at 356. William, also known as "Ricky," was born May 3, 1989.
See Appellant's Brief, app. at 25, Wintz (No. 980244).
6. See Wintz, 2, 593 N.W.2d at 356. Bill served in the Air Force and was stationed in Germany
for a total of six and a half years. See Appellant's Brief, app. at 48, Wintz (No. 980244).
.7. Sie Wintz, 2, 593 N.W.2d at 356. The Separation Agreement was entered on March 23,
1992, and was prepared by an Air Force Judge Advocate General (JAG) Officer. See Appellant's
Brief, app. at 15, 65, Wintz (No. 980244).
8. See Wintz, 2, 593 N.W.2d at 356. The separation agreement also outlined Bill's and Sandra's
agreement for the visitation of the children. See Appellant's Brief, app. at 16-17, Wintz (No. 980244).
As agreed by the couple, Bill was entitled to have the children the first and third weekend of every
month, alternating holidays, and four weeks during summer vacation every year. See id. The agree-
ment further provided conditions for the exchange of the children and stated that Bill would be
responsible for the expenses in the exercise of his visitation rights. See id. at 17.
Although never ordered by a court, see id., app. at 42, the separation agreement stated that Bill
would make a monthly $400 payment to Sandra as child support, see id., app. at 17. The Agreement
provided that "[s]hould an action for support or divorce be filed in a court of law, both parties agree
that child support shall be set according to the child support guidelines effective in that particular
jurisdiction." Id. The separation agreement further stated that Bill would send an additional monthly
payment of $150 to Sandra as spousal support for a period of 12 months or until remarriage, divorce,
or death. See id.
Also contained in the separation agreement was the following language pertaining to court
ratification:
In the event that an action for divorce or dissolution of marriage is instituted by either
party against the other, the parties hereto agree that they shall be bound by all the terms
of this Agreement and that this Agreement shall not be merged in any decree or judg-
ment that may be granted in such action, but shall survive the same and shall be forever
binding and conclusive on the parties, but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the
decree or judgment in any such action from incorporating in full or in substance the
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following the separation. 9 In 1993, Sandra went to Mexico and obtained
a divorce.10 The divorce decree provided that Sandra would retain
custody of the children.ll Relying on the divorce decree, both Bill and
Sandra remarried. 12 From 1993 to 1997, the children lived with Sandra
in New York, California, and Arizona.13
Pursuant to an agreement between Sandra and Bill that provided
that Bill would "[h]ave extended visitation/custody for the [19197/98
school year," the children came to live with their father in Minot, North
Dakota.14 The agreement also stated, "If either child desires to stay
beyond the school year, additional arrangements will be made by the
maternal parents."1 5 In May 1998, Sandra asked when the children
terms of this Agreement.
Id., app. at 20.
9. See Wintz, 1 2, 593 N.W.2d at 356. Sandra returned to her home state of New York where
she and the children resided for approximately three years before moving to California for a short
time and then to their current home in Arizona. See Appellant's Brief at 1, app. at 26, Wintz (No.
980244).
10. See Wintz, 2, 593 N.W.2d at 356. The divorce decree was entered July 13, 1993, in Tlax-
cala, Mexico; judgment was entered by default because Bill did not appear. See Appellant's Brief,
app. at 11-12, Wintz (No. 980244). Neither Bill nor Sandra had ever lived in Mexico. See id. at 1.
11. See Wintz, 2, 593 N.W.2d at 356-57. The relevant portion of the divorce decree stated:
"[T]he minor children NADIA CHERI and WILLIAM RICHARD shall remain with and under the
custody of their mother: 'SANDRA JEAN CRABTREE."' Appellant's Brief, app. at 13, Wintz (No.
980244).
12. See Wintz, 1 2, 593 N.W.2d at 357.
13. See id. 3. According to Bill, the children visited him in Germany for approximately two
months in 1995. See Appellant's Brief, app. at 25, Wintz (No. 980244). Sandra, however, testified that
the duration of the summer visit was six weeks, rather than two months. See id, app. at 81. Other than
this visit, the children lived exclusively with their mother prior to coming to North Dakota to live with
Bill and his wife for the 1997-1998 school year. See Appellee's Brief at 2, Wintz (No. 980244).
14. Wintz, 3, 593 N.W.2d at 357 (quoting Extended Visitation/Custodial Agreement, Appellant's
Brief, app. at 24, Wintz (No. 980244)). Bill was transferred from Germany to Minot Air Force Base in
August of 1997. See Appellant's Brief, app. at 28, Wintz (No. 980244).
15. Wintz, 3, 593 N.W.2d at 357 (quoting Extended Visitation/Custodial Agreement, Appellant's
Brief, app. at 24, Wintz (No. 980244)). Bill prepared the Extended Visitation/Custodial Agreement
after approximately 12 months of negotiation with Sandra. See Appellant's Brief, app. at 90-91, Wintz
(No. 980244); Appellee's Brief at 2, Wintz (No. 980244). Sandra testified that Bill wanted the
agreement to include the statement about the children staying with him beyond the school year. See
Appellant's Brief, app. at 91, Wintz (No. 980244). Her acquiescence to allow that statement in the
Agreement was a way to "appease" Bill, but she had no intention of allowing either of her children to
remain with Bill, even if they had expressed a desire to do so:
Q And you had previously agreed to-isn't it true that if the children wanted to stay
longer for another school year that this is something that could be considered as
well. Is that right?
A [Sandra] No, I would not really consider it.
Q Well, didn't you write a letter to Bill on February 5th stating that it was for one
year unless the children wanted to stay for another school year.
A [Sandra] Unless the children-unless the children had a desire, but I still wouldn't
do it. It was just a way to appease him, cause I knew that they would never have
that desire.
Q But you did appease him in that there was some confusion about exactly when
the children would be returning to your custody. Isn't that correct?
A [Sandra] Not really. I was absolutely certain I would get my kids at the end of
May. I had no reason to think otherwise and we were counting the days....
Id., app. at 91-92.
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would be returned to her.16 Bill asked if the children could stay with
him for another year, but Sandra declined.17
Subsequently, Bill filed a motion in North Dakota district court to
modify the custody order. 18 Sandra responded, alleging that the district
court lacked jurisdiction.19 Agreeing with Sandra, the district court dis-
missed Bill's motion. 20 The district court decided that it would not
exercise jurisdiction to modify custody because Arizona was the "home
state" of the children when the motion was filed.21 Also, the district
court declined jurisdiction because it considered North Dakota an incon-
venient forum under North Dakota Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act.22
Bill appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court,23 arguing that
under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)24 and the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA),25 North Dakota was the
children's "home state." Therefore, he argued, that the district court
erred in determining that Arizona, rather than North Dakota, was the
children's home state.26 Bill also asserted that the district court abused
its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction on the basis that North
Dakota was an inconvenient forum. 27
16. See Wintz, 1 3, 593 N.W.2d at 357. As early as March or April of 1998, Bill had begun
asking Sandra about letting the children stay with him beyond the end of the school year, but Sandra
refused, repeatedly telling him that she wanted the children returned to her at the end of the school
year. See Appellee's Brief at 3, Wintz (No. 980244).
17. See Wintz, 1 3, 593 N.W.2d at 357.
18. See id. 4. Bill filed a Rule 3.2 motion to Modify Divorce Judgment on April 29, 1998. See
Appellant's Brief, app. at 3, Wintz (No. 980244). Prior to this, Bill sent legal documents to Sandra, in-
cluding a proposed motion to modify divorce decree and a stipulation to change custody. See Appel-
lee's Brief at 3, Wintz (No. 980244). Sandra refused to sign the stipulation. See id. After the Motion
to Change Custody was filed, Bill informed Sandra that he would not be returning the children. See id.
19. See Wintz, 1 4, 593 N.W.2d at 357. Sandra responded by a limited appearance for the sole
purpose of contesting jurisdiction. See Appellant's Brief, app. at 27, Wintz (No. 980244). Neither
party was ever a legal resident of North Dakota. See Appellee's Brief at 5, Wintz (No. 980244).
Bill's legal residence is the state of Texas. See Appellant's Brief, app. at 60, Wintz (No. 980244).
20. See Wintz, 4, 593 N.W.2d at 357.
21. See id. (restating the findings of the district court).
22. See id. Recently, Chapter 14-14 of the North Dakota Century Code, Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), was repealed. See 1999 N.D. Laws ch. 147, § 3. It was replaced by Chap-
ter 14-14.1 of the North Dakota Century Code, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA), which became effective August 1, 1999. See id. § 1. The most significant change is that
the UCCJEA gave jurisdictional priority and exclusive continuing jurisdiction to the home state. See
Kelly Gaines Stoner, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)-A Meta-
morphosis of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 75 N.D. L. REv. 301, 305 (1999).
23. See Appellant's Brief, app. at 33, Wintz (No. 980244).
24. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
25. Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3568 (1980) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998)).
26. See Appellant's Brief at 3-5, Wintz (No. 980244).
27. See id. at 6-11.
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After briefly reflecting on the question of whether North Dakota
had jurisdiction, the North Dakota Supreme Court announced that it
need not decide whether the district court erred in holding that it did not
have jurisdiction to modify custody.28 Rather, because the district court
declined to exercise jurisdiction based on its conclusion that North
Dakota was an inconvenient forum, 2 9 the North Dakota Supreme Court
focused its review on whether the district court abused its discretion on
the inconvenient forum finding.30 After reviewing the record, the court
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
North Dakota was an inconvenient forum 31 and affirmed the dismissal of
the motion to modify custody.32
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act were designed to promote judicial consisten-
cy in child custody determinations 33 and to ensure that such determina-
tions would be honored in all states. 34 An important element of both of
these provisions is the application of "home state" jurisdiction, which is
one of the bases a court uses to decide if it has the jurisdictional authori-
ty to render a child custody determination. 35 Unfortunately, courts have
reached conflicting results concerning what is required to establish home
state jurisdiction.36
A. THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT AND THE
PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act was developed as a
model act by a group of scholars as a solution to jurisdictional issues
surrounding interstate child custody disputes. 37 The primary goals of
28. See Wintz v. Crabtree, 1999 ND 85, 1 7, 593 N.W.2d 355, 358.
29. See id. 7-8. "Even assuming North Dakota arguably is the children's home state, the [dis-
trict] court nevertheless concluded North Dakota should decline jurisdiction because it is an incon-
venient forum." Id. 7.
30. The decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction on inconvenient forum grounds is within the
trial court's discretion and will be overturned only it the court has abused its discretion. See id. 1 8.
31. See id. I 11.
32. See id. 13.
33. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-01(l)(a)-(i) (1997) (repealed 1999) (listing the goals of
the UCCJA), and UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 1, 9 U.L.A. 271 (1999), with infra text
accompanying notes 50-51 (enumerating congressional findings and goals for the PKPA).
34. See Stoner, supra note 22, at 303 (discussing the historical origins of the UCCJA and its
inadequacies which prompted the enactment of the PKPA).
35. See Stoner, supra note 22, at 304.
36. See Wintz v. Crabtree, 1999 ND 85, 7, 593 N.W.2d 355, 357-58.
37. See Stoner, supra note 22, at 302.
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the UCCJA were to avoid jurisdictional competition, promote coopera-
tion between courts, assure that litigation concerning child custody
occurs where the child and the family have the closest connection,
discourage continuing custody controversies, deter parental abductions
of children, avoid relitigation of issues already decided in other jurisdic-
tions, facilitate the enforcement of other state's custody decrees, promote
the exchange of information between courts, and create uniform child
custody laws. 38 The UCCJA was meant to end the jurisdictional power
struggles between states involved in interstate custody disputes. 39 The
UCCJA was adopted by North Dakota in 196940 and was in effect until
August 1, 1999.41
Of the purposes enumerated by the UCCJA, one primary concern
was to prevent parental child snatching for the purpose of obtaining a
more favorable forum following a divorce action. 42 The UCCJA also
sought to thwart repeated custody disputes, which are extremely harmful
to children.4 3 The UCCJA attempted to achieve this purpose by estab-
lishing jurisdictional rules requiring custody litigation to take place in
the forum with the most significant contacts or connections with the
child.44
Even under the UCCJA, however, courts were not required to extend
full faith and credit to custody decrees from other states.45 The UCCJA
also failed to address the problem of continuing jurisdiction and "the
38. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-01(I)(a)-(i) (1997) (repealed 1999); UNIF. CHIuDCUSTODY
JURISDICTION AcT § 1, 9 U.L.A. 271 (1999).
39. See Stoner, supra note 22, at 301.
40. See 1969 N.D. Laws, ch. 154. The UCCJA was also adopted by the other 49 states, the
District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands. See Stoner, supra note 22, at 302.
41. See supra text accompanying note 22.
42. See Stoner, supra note 22, at 302. The policy behind the UCCJA is the same as that of the
PKPA, which is "to deter, if not prevent, 'child snatching."' State v. Rathjen, 455 N.W.2d 845, 848
(N.D. 1990) (quoting State ex rel. Valles v. Brown, 639 P.2d 1181, 1183 (N.M. 1981)).
43. See Stoner, supra note 22, at 302 (citing Henry H. Foster, Child Custody Jurisdiction: UCCJA
and PKPA, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 297, 300 n.15 (1981)).
44. See Stoner, supra note 22, at 302-03.
45. See Stoner, supra note 22, at 303. This was initially in part because some states were slow to
enact the UCCJA, which created "safe harbors" for parents seeking to move their children to another
forum where they could attempt to modify existing custody decrees. See Greg Waller, Note, When
the Rules Don't Fit the Game: Application of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act to Interstate Adoption Proceedings, 33 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 271, 279
(1996)). Where the UCCJA was adopted, states often enacted a modified version of the act, which
undermined the act's uniform application. See id. Additionally, even where uniform versions of the
UCCJA were enacted, courts often interpreted identical provisions differently than courts in other
states. See id.
2000]
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potential for concurrent jurisdiction between two states."'46 The purport-
ed gaps in the UCCJA, which allowed contestants to circumvent the Act's
purposes, prompted Congress to enact the Parental Kidnapping Preven-
tion Act 47 in 1980.48 The PKPA mandates which custody orders will
have the full faith and credit of sister states.49 The historical and statu-
tory notes to the PKPA provide congressional findings detailing the
necessity for establishing national standards for determining which
courts should exercise jurisdiction in interstate child custody matters.5 0
The stated purposes of the PKPA are essentially the same as those of the
46. Luna v. Luna, 1999 ND 79, 10, 592 N.W.2d 557, 561 (citing Roger M. Baron, Child Cus-
tody Jurisdiction, 38 S.D. L. REv. 479, 489 (1993) ("Congress closed the loopholes which had evolved
under the UCCJA, strengthening the exclusive nature of continuing jurisdiction.")). Concurrent juris-
diction arises when more than one jurisdictional authority may have grounds to assert jurisdiction. See
Stoner, supra note 22, at 312; see also In re Marriage of Schoeffel, 644 N.E.2d 827, 830 (111. App. Ct.
1994) (acknowledging that more than one state may have jurisdiction under the UCCJA). For ex-
ample, under the UCCJA, jurisdiction may be assumed under four bases: (1) "home state," (2) "signifi-
cant connection," (3) emergency, or (4) residual. See infra note 57. Therefore, a court in the child's
home state has jurisdiction to modify a child custody decree. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-03(1)(a)
(1997) (repealed 1999) (quoted infra note 57). However, a court in another state to which the child
has a substantial connection may also assert jurisdiction. See id. § 14-14-03(1)(b) (quoted infra note
57). Aggressive litigants and receptive courts creatively exploited this loophole, which had evolved
under the UCCJA. See Baron, supra, at 489.
47. See Luna, 1 10, 592 N.W.2d at 561 (citing Annotation, Child Custody: When Does State That
Issued Previous Custody Determination Have Continuing Jurisdiction Under Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A, 83
A.L.R. 4th 742, 748 (1991) (stating that the UCCJA was enacted to thwart a "national epidemic of
parental kidnapping" and that the PKPA was later added in an attempt to solve still existing problems
under the UCCJA)).
48. See supra note 25.
49. See Stoner, supra note 22, at 303.
50. See Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7, 94 Stat. 3568 (1980) (codified as amended at § 1738A (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998). Congress found: (1) there was a growing number of child custody disputes; (2) deci-
sions rendered by courts were often inconsistent and conflicting; (3) parties involved in custody
disputes frequently resorted to seizing and concealing their children; and (4) courts had not given full
faith and credit to custody decisions made by sister states which caused burdens to commerce and
harmed the welfare of involved children and their parents. See id. Therefore it was necessary to
establish national standards for courts to use in determining their jurisdiction to decide such custody
issues, and to ensure that such decisions were given their full effect by other states. See id.
702
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UCCJA.51 Custody orders are entitled to the full faith and credit of other
states if they substantially comply with the PKPA.52
Against this statutory backdrop, the element of home state status is
an important factor in determining if a state has jurisdiction. 53 Under
the UCCJA, the determination of the child's home state is just one of
four bases on which a court may establish jurisdiction. 54 Under the
PKPA, however, the home state is given priority over the other bases, thus
making the question of home state status central in determining whether
a state has jurisdiction. 55 According to the PKPA, a state may not
exercise jurisdiction under the other bases of jurisdiction if another state
remains the child's home state. 56
B. "HOME STATE" JURISDICTION
Under the UCCJA, jurisdiction may be assumed under four bases:
(1) "home state," (2) "significant connection," (3) emergency, or (4)
residual. 57  The bases for jurisdiction in the PKPA are essentially the
51. See id. The stated purposes of the PKPA are to:
(1) promote cooperation between State courts to the end that a determination of custody
and visitation is rendered in the State which can best decide the case in the interest
of the child;
(2) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual
assistance between States which are concerned with the same child;
(3) facilitate the enforcement of custody and visitation decrees of sister States;
(4) discourage continuing interstate controversies over child custody in the interest of
greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the
child;
(5) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between State courts in matters of child
custody and visitation which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from
State to State with harmful effects on their well-being; and
(6) deter interstate abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to
obtain custody and visitation awards.
Id.
52. See Stoner, supra note 22, at 303.
53. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-03(l)(a) (1997) (repealed 1999); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(c)(2)(A) (1994).
54. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-03 (quoted infra note 57); UNEF. CHILD CUSTODY JuRsDICriON
AcT § 3, 9 U.L.A. 307-08 (1999).
55. See Stoner, supra note 22, at 304.
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B) (1994).
57. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-03; UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3,9 U.L.A. 307-
08 (1999); see also In Re Marriage of Arulpragasam and Eisele, 709 N.E.2d 725, 732 (I11. App. Ct.
1999) (using brief descriptors for the four bases of assuming jurisdiction). The UCCJA provides that:
1. A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has
jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial decree or modification
decree if:
a. This state (1) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the
proceeding, or (2) had been the child's home state within six months before com-
mencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state because of the
child's removal or retention by a person claiming the child's custody or for other
reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this state;
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same. 58 The PKPA, however, unlike the UCCJA, gives preference to
home state jurisdiction.59 Under the PKPA, a state may exercise jurisdic-
tion only if no other state has home state jurisdiction. 60 Both the UCCJA
and the PKPA define "home state" in the same way:61 A child's "home
b. It is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction
because (1) the child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one
contestant, have a significant connection with this state, and (2) there is available
in this state substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships;
c. The child is physically present in this state and (1) the child has been abandoned or
(2) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglect-
ed, dependent, or deprived; or
d. (1) It appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites
substantially in accordance with subdivision a, b, or c, or another state has
declined toexercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more
appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (2) it is in the best
interest of the child that this court assume jurisdiction.
2. Except under subdivisions c and d of subsection 1, physical presence in this state of
the child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on a court of this state to make a child custody determination.
3. Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to
determine his custody.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-03 (codified UCCJA); UNw. CHLD CuSTODY JURISDICnoN ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A.
307-08 (1999).
58. See Stoner, supra note 22, at 304. The PKPA provides:
A child custody or visitation determination made by a court of a State is consistent with
the provisions of this section only if-
( 1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and
(2) one of the following conditions is met:
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of the commencement of
the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home State within six months before
the date of the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from
such State because of his removal or retention by a contestant or for other
reasons, and a contestant continues to live in such State;
(B) (i)it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A),
and (ii) it is in, the best interest of the child that a court of such State assume
jurisdiction because (I) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one
contestant, have a significant connection with such State other than mere
physical presence in such State, and (II) there is available in such State
substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships;
(C) the child is physically present in such State and (i) the child has been abandoned,
or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse;
(D) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph
(A), (B), (C), or (E), or another State has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that the State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the more appropriate forum
to determine the custody or visitation of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest
of the child that such court assume jurisdiction; or
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this section.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (1994).
59. See Stoner, supra note 22, at 304.
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B) (1994).
61. The few differences between the definitions for "home state" in the UCCJA and the PKPA
are in syntax and punctuation, with no resulting difference in meaning. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-14-02(5) (1997) (repealed 1999) (defining home state for the UCCJA), with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(b)(4) (1994) (defining home state for the PKPA).
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state" is where the child has lived for six consecutive months prior to the
start of any custodial proceeding. 62
The failure of the UCCJA to establish a priority of jurisdictional
bases created a loophole allowing courts to utilize the jurisdictional bases
as they saw fit.63 The PKPA was enacted to remedy such loopholes by
establishing a national standard that states could look to in resolving
interstate custody disputes 64 and by mandating that custody orders
receive the full faith and credit of sister states. 65 The home state prefer-
ence of the PKPA also extends to modifying existing custody decrees.66
The PKPA authorizes continuing exclusive jurisdiction in the state where
the original decree was given, as long as one parent or the child still
resides in the state and the state has continuing jurisdiction under its own
laws.67
A feature of home state jurisdiction as defined in the UCCJA and
the PKPA is that periods of temporary absence of a child, parent, or
person acting as a parent, are counted as part of the six-month period
required to establish home state status. 68 For example, in Anderson v.
Anderson,69 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that New York did
not lose its status as the home state of the child in question even though
the child spent a portion of the six-month period, required to make New
York the home state, visiting his mother in North Dakota. 70 While the
North Dakota Supreme Court seemed to have little difficulty finding that
a four-week visit was a temporary absence, the court has not clearly
stated how if defines or applies temporary absence to an extended period
of visitation. 7 1
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4).
"[H]ome State" means the State in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the
child lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six
consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than six months old, the State in which
the child lived from birth with any of such persons. Periods of temporary absence of any
of such persons are counted as part of the six-month or other period ....
Id.
63. See Stoner, supra note 22, at 305.
64. See Luna v. Luna, 1999 ND 79, 10, 592 N.W.2d 557, 561-62.
65. See Stoner, supra note 22 at 303; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (Supp. IV 1998).
66. See Stoner, supra note 22, at 304 (citing Robert G. Spector, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion and Enforcement Act, 32 FAM. L.Q. 301, 305 (1998)).
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (Supp. IV 1998).
68. See id. § 1738A(b)(4) (quoted supra note 62); N.D. CErr. CODE § 14-14-02(5) (1997)
(repealed 1999).
69. 449 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1989).
70. See Anderson v. Anderson, 449 N.W.2d 799, 802 (N.D. 1989) (finding that a four-week visit
to North Dakota was a temporary absence and that the period of the visit counted toward the
six-month period required to make New York the child's home state).
71. See id, The court had the opportunity to decide this issue, but it declined to do so. See Wintz
v. Crabtree, 1999 ND 85, 1 7, 593 N.W.2d 355, 358.
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C. TEMPORARY PRESENCE AND JURISDICTION-CONFLICTING RESULTS
Although courts disagree about its precise definition, a temporary
presence72 is simply a child's interstate visit to a non-custodial parent or
a person acting as a parent.73 The specific question faced by the courts
is whether a child's temporary presence in a state for more than six
months, with the permission of the other party, is sufficient to establish
jurisdiction in that state. 74 While it is agreed that home state jurisdiction
results from the child's physical presence in the state,75 the North Dakota
Supreme Court has not decided whether a child's permissive presence in
the state "starts the clock" for establishing the six consecutive months
required by the UCCJA for home state jurisdiction.76
The North Dakota Supreme Court in Wintz v. Crabtree77 has
recognized that courts facing this question have reached opposite results
and has referred to four Illinois cases, 78 two of which held that the
temporary presence of a child for more than six months was sufficient to
establish home state jurisdiction.79 The two other Illinois cases held that
72. Neither the UCCJA nor the PKPA actually contain the phrase "temporary presence" and in-
stead refer to the "temporary absence" of the child from the home state. See N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-14-02(5); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4) (quoted supra note 62). Some courts have applied the dic-
tionary definition of the terms. See In re Marriage of Richardson, 625 N.E.2d 1122, 1124 (111. App. Ct.
1993) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 8, 1312 (5th ed. 1979) (stating that "temporary" means
limited in time as opposed to indefinite or perpetual, and that "absence" means being absent or away
from one's domicile or usual place of residence)). The Richardson court also noted that "'[tem-
porary absence' does not connote a particular length of time. Under appropriate circumstances, the
term can apply to a period of many months." Id. Other courts have explicitly rejected this approach.
See In re Marriage of Arulpragasam and Eisele, 709 N.E.2d 725, 732 (11. App. Ct. 1999) ("[T]he
'temporary absence' provision is designed merely to prevent lapses in the six-month period caused by
brief interstate visits by the child.").
73. See Wintz, 7, 593 N.W.2d at 357 (noting that a temporary presence may result from a visita-
tion order or by the consent of the parties).
74. See id.
75. See Hangsleben v. Oliver, 502 N.W.2d 838, 843 (N.D. 1993) (holding that a child's physical
presence has priority over her legal residence in determining home state jurisdiction). In Hangsleben,
at the request of the custodial parent, a child lived with her grandparents in North Dakota for more
than six months. See id. Without addressing whether this stay was temporary or permanent, the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that North Dakota had become the child's home state. See id. The court
found that the grandparents were clearly "persons acting as parents" under section 14-14-02(5) of the
North Dakota Century Code. Id.
76. See Wintz, 7, 593 N.W.2d at 358 (declining to determine if North Dakota is the home state
on the basis of a six-month permissive visit). In Wintz, the North Dakota Supreme Court avoided
deciding whether a permissive, temporary six-month presence by a child in the state would confer
home state jurisdiction by basing its judgment on an inconvenient forum analysis. See id.
77. 1999 ND 85, 593 N.W.2d 355.
78. See Wintz, 593 N.W.2d at 357-58.
79. See id. (citing In re Marriage of Arulpragasam and Eisele, 709 N.E.2d 725, 732 (11. App. Ct.
1999) (holding that a simple home state test should be applied: "Where has the child lived with a
person acting as a parent for the last six months?")); see also In re Marriage of Schoeffel, 644 N.E.2d
827, 830 (I1. App. Ct. 1994) (finding that a nine month stay in another state was not a temporary
absence and applying the home state test later adopted by Arulpragasam).
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such a presence was deemed inadequate for establishing home state
jurisdiction. 80
This split can be traced to In re Marriage of Richardson.81 In
Richardson, the majority found that Illinois did not obtain jurisdiction to
modify custody by the child's eleven-month presence in the state for the
purpose of attending school.82 One justice, in a special concurrence,
agreed with the result, but disagreed with the rationale of the majority. 83
The justice writing the special concurrence argued that Illinois became
the child's home state because the child had resided in the state for more
than six consecutive months. 84 Nevertheless, according to the special
concurrence, the court was correct in declining to exercise jurisdiction,
but should have done so on the grounds that Illinois was an inconvenient
forum. 85
Subsequent cases in Illinois have adopted the reasoning of either the
Richardson majority86 or its special concurrence. 87 The decisions hinge
on the application of the phrase "temporary absence" from the
UCCJA's definition of home state. 88 On one hand, the phrase is not
precisely defined, nor does it connote a particular period of time.89
Rather, "[u]nder appropriate circumstances, the term can be applied to a
period of many months." 90 From the other perspective, the temporary
80. See Wintz, 593 N.W.2d at 357-58 (citing In re Frost, 681 N.E.2d 1030, 1036 (I1. App. Ct.
1997) (holding that a court may consider the intent of the parents in determining whether a child's
out-of-state visit of more than six months is sufficient to establish home state jurisdiction in that state));
see also In re Marriage of Richardson, 625 N.E.2d 1122, 1126 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (finding that a
child's 11 month visit to another state did not establish home state jurisdiction there).
81. 625 N.E.2d 1122 (111. App. Ct. 1993).
82. See Richardson, 625 N.E.2d at 1123. In Richardson, the parties divorced in California and
were awarded joint custody of their daughter, provided that her primary residence would be with her
father. See id. The mother moved to Illinois while the daughter continued to live with her father in
California. See id. Pursuant to a written agreement between the parents, the father permitted the
daughter to live in Illinois with her mother for the purpose of attending school for the year. See id. At
the end of the school year the child was returned to her father, who had since moved to Arizona to
obtain employment, but the mother subsequently filed a petition in Illinois seeking to modify custody.
See id.
83. See id. at 1127 (Barry, J., specially concurring).
84. See id.
85. See id. at 1129.
86. See supra text accompanying note 80.
87. See supra text accompanying note 79.
88. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-02(5) (1997) (repealed 1999). The statute states that
"[p]eriods of temporary absence of any of the named persons are counted as part of the six-month or
other period." Id.
89. See In re Marriage of Richardson, 625 N.E.2d 1122, 1124 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); see also In re
Frost, 681 N.E.2d 1030, 1035 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
90. Frost, 681 N.E.2d at 1035. For example, under the Richardson approach, applied by the court
in Frost, an extended permissive visit for the purpose of attending school should be considered a
"temporary absence" because such a view encourages extended visitation agreements without one
party having to worry about losing a jurisdictional forum because of the duration of the permissive
visit. See id. at 1035-36.
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absence provision "is designed merely to prevent lapses in the
six-month period caused by brief interstate visits by the child."91 The
Richardson special concurrence acknowledged that temporary absence is
not defined in the statute, but it emphasized that the home state provision
required six consecutive months of presence. 92 Hence, it would be
illogical that the legislature intended that an absence greater than six
months would be considered temporary. 93
Another area of divergence between the two views concerns the
intent of the contesting parties. 94 The Richardson majority urged that
in determining a child's home state a court should not only examine
the child's physical presence, but also the circumstances surrounding
his or her stay in the state.95 Under this standard, a court may consider
"the parents' agreement and their intent regarding the temporary or
permanent status of the child's out-of-state absence." 96
91. In re Marriage of Arulpragasam and Eisele, 709 N.E.2d 725, 732 (I11. App. Ct. 1999) (citing
In re Marriage of Schoeffel, 644 N.E.2d 827, 830 (111. App. Ct. 1994)).
92. See Richardson, 625 N.E.2d at 1127 (Barry, J., specially concurring). "This leads me to
believe that the legislature meant that only 'absences' less [than] six months within the relevant
6-month period may be 'temporary."' Id.
93. See id.
94. See Frost, 681 N.E.2d at 1035-36. The court in Frost adopted the Richardson analysis and
stated that under such an analysis, a court could consider the parent's agreement and their intent
regarding whether a child's out of state absence should be considered permanent or temporary. See
id. However, the court noted that the Schoeffel court refused to consider the intent of the parties when
it rejected a father's argument that time spent by his wife and children outside of Illinois was a
temporary absence. See id. In Schoeffel, a New York couple with two children moved to Illinois and
lived there together for exactly six months. See 644 N.E.2d at 828. The wife then took the children
and moved back to New York. See id. Six months after moving back to New York, the wife and
children returned to Illinois for two weeks in hopes of a reconciliation. See id. The attempt failed,
and the wife and the children returned to New York and had no further contact with Illinois. See id.
One month later, which was seven months after their initial return to New York, the father filed a
petition for dissolution of marriage in Illinois. See id. A default judgment was entered against the
wife. See id. The wife appeared specially to challenge Illinois jurisdiction, and the trial court decided
in her favor ordering that custody issues be resolved in New York. See id. The father advanced an
argument that his wife and children did not permanently leave Illinois until after the failed reconcili-
ation attempt; hence, their presence in New York prior to the failed reconciliation attempt was a tem-
porary absence. See id. at 830. The court rejected this argument, holding that it would not attribute
time spent in New York to the state of Illinois based on the alleged intent of the parties. See id.
95. See Richardson, 625 N.E.2d at 1124.
96. Frost, 681 N.E.2d at 1036. In Frost, a purported father commenced an action to establish
paternity, custody, visitation, and child support. See id. at 1032. The mother and child lived with him
in Chicago for several years before traveling to California to spend the summer with relatives. See id.
The purported father alleged that the mother became undecided about whether to return to Chicago
while she and the child were in California. See id The mother enrolled the child in school in Cali-
fornia and the purported father later learned that the mother did not intend to return with the child.
See id. The mother argued that Illinois did not have jurisdiction to decide the matter because Califor-
nia had become the child's home state. See id. The mother also alleged that she had already filed a
parentage action in California. See id. The purported father responded that he did not take legal
measures to stop the child's relocation because the mother had previously indicated that her stay in
California was temporary. See id. at 1032-33. The court reasoned that the Richardson approach,
which allows a court to take into consideration the intent of the parties in determining whether an
absence is permanent or temporary, should be applied. See id. at 1035-36. Because of the lack of a
written agreement defining the nature of the child's absence from Illinois and because accounts by the
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Courts adhering to the contrary view assert that the intent of the par-
ties does not control the jurisdictional outcome. 97 These courts believe
that by considering the intent of the parties, courts can confuse a per-
son's domicile, which is primarily a question of intent, with that of pres-
ence for home state purposes. 98 The latter is not dependent on intent,
according to these courts, but is primarily a question of the amount of
time a contestant or child has been in the state. 99 Courts holding this
view reject the need to consider circumstantial facts in favor of applying
a simple home state rule: "Where has the child lived with a person
acting as a parent for the last six months?"l00
Both sides of the issue are supported by public policy rationale. 101
The perspective set forth by Richardson and later adopted by In re Frost
v. Frost,102 that a child's permissive interstate visit of more than six
months does not automatically confer home state jurisdiction to the
visited state, asserts that parents who live in separate states should be
encouraged to negotiate extended interstate visits for their children.103
The perspective contends that the application of the "simple 'home
state' test" 104 would discourage such agreements "because of the
potential legal consequences to the custodial parent."105 A parent
parties as to whether there was a mutual agreement conflicted, the court remanded the case for an
evidentiary hearing to determine if the child's absence was, indeed, temporary. See id. at 1036.
Richardson also provides a good example of a court considering the intent of the parties, as the court
weighed heavily the fact that it was the clear understanding of both parties that the child would return
to her father at the conclusion of the school year. See Richardson, 625 N.E.2d at 1125; see also supra
text accompanying note 81.
97. See Schoeffel, 644 N.E.2d at 829 (finding that a two-week out of state attempt at a reconcilia-
tion between the parties did not have the effect of voiding the home state status of New York when the
children had lived in New York for seven consecutive months).
98. See id. "It is a mistake to incorporate all the nuances of domicile into the Act's definition of
'home State.' It is also a mistake to allow parties to make agreements which control the operation of
the Act." Id. at 830.
99. See id. at 829.
100. In re Marriage of Arulpragasam and Eisele, 709 N.E.2d 725, 732 (II1. App. Ct. 1999)
(applying the home state test as articulated in Schoeffel). The Schoeffel court said that the Richardson
majority unnecessarily complicated what was meant to be a simple "home state" test when it held that
the 11 months the child spent in Illinois were only a "temporary absence." See Schoeffel, 644 N.E.2d
at 830.
101. See Wintz v. Crabtree, 1999 ND 85, 7, 593 N.W.2d 355, 358. At least one Illinois court
noted that the difference in analysis may be driven as a matter of policy preference, rather than strict
statutory construction. See Frost, 681 N.E.2d at 1035 (noting that the Richardson special concurrence
conceded that "temporary absence" was not statutorily defined). Thus, courts may choose their
analyses based on a preference for the mathematical certainty achieved by a strict application of the
six-month stay required to establish home state jurisdiction. See id. Courts may also be opposed to the
possibility that the application of statute's six-month requirement could be controlled by means of an
agreement between the parents. See Schoeffel, 644 N.E.2d at 830.
102. 681 N.E.2d 1030 (Il1. App. Ct. 1997).
103. See Frost, 681 N.E.2d at 1035-36; In re Marriage of Richardson, 625 N.E.2d 1122, 1125
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
104. Arulpragasam, 709 N.E.2d at 732 ("[W]here has the child lived with a person acting as a
parent for the last six months?").
105. Richardson, 625 N.E.2d at 1125. "The freedom to reach such agreements should not be
hampered by fear that jurisdiction would vest in another state if the out-of-state absence extends
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unaware of the other parent's breach of promise to return the child
would lose the right to start a proceeding in his or her state after six
months, even if the parent believed the child would be returned at the
end of the permitted visit. 106 The result would be a "chilling effect" on
extended visitation agreements and family relationships would suffer. 107
While applying the simple home state test provides mathematical cer-
tainty, it may bring about unfair results. 108 The Frost court decided that
the Richardson analysis was more flexible and fair. 109 Further, applying
it would discourage the premature filing of custody proceedings by the
local parent for the sole purpose of preserving jurisdiction. 10
The position espoused by the Richardson special concurrence also
arguably furthers valid policy concerns.111 The Richardson special
concurrence argued that applying the more flexible approach, as the
Richardson majority did, essentially renders the UCCJA's six-month
consecutive residency requirement meaningless.112 Under the majority's
analysis, an out-of-state parent could always argue that the child's
presence in the state was only temporary in order to defeat home state
jurisdiction."l 3 The special concurrence also disagreed that application
of its view would discourage extended interstate visitation agreements
between divorced parents.114 Since determination of jurisdiction under
the UCCJA "is predicated on the best interests of the child,"115 courts
will use their discretion and decide whether a forum is appropriate based
on inconvenient forum grounds."l 6 Therefore, even if a new home state
is established in the course of an extended visit, the custodial parent has
not necessarily lost his or her opportunity for an action to be decided in
that parent's state. 117 This is in accord with one of the general purposes
beyond six months." Frost, 681 N.E.2d at 1035.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. The Frost court noted that inequitable results were especially likely to occur in fact
situations in which there is no written agreement providing for the extended interstate visit of a child.
See id. In that case, the court reversed the trial court, which had dismissed a petition to establish
custody on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. See id. at 1032, 1036-37. The case was remanded to
determine whether the child's absence was "temporary" based on the verbal agreements of the
parents. See id.
109. See id. at 1036.
110. See id.
111. See In re Marriage of Richardson, 625 N.E.2d 1122, 1127 (II1. App. Ct. 1993) (Barry, J.,
specially concurring).
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1128.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. See id. Courts using the Richardson special concurrence analysis note that more than one
state may have jurisdiction under the UCCJA. See In re Marriage of Schoeffel, 644 N.E.2d 827, 830
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994); see also In re Marriage of Arulpragasam and Eisele, 709 N.E.2d 725, 730 (Il.
App. Ct. 1999). Therefore, vesting a state with home state jurisdiction after a six-month continued
presence of a child does not necessarily divest jurisdiction from the previous home state. See In re
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of the UCCJA, which is to assure that custodial procedings take place in
the forum with the closest connection to the child.)18
The way the definition of temporary absence or temporary presence
will be applied to permissive interstate visits of more than six months
remains unsettled in North Dakota. 119 This is, in part, because the North
Dakota Supreme Court has decided that the question of home state
jurisdiction need not be determined in cases in which jurisdiction has
already been declined on inconvenient forum grounds.120
D. INCONVENIENT FORUM
The UCCJA provides direction on inconvenient forum issues. 1 21 A
court that has jurisdiction under the UCCJA may decline to exercise juris-
diction if it determines that a court of another state is a more appropriate
forum.122 Thus, North Dakota courts apply a two-pronged inquiry in
resolving inconvenient forum issues in child custody cases. 123 The first
prong is designed to determine if the court actually has jurisdiction. 124
The second prong is designed to determine whether exercising that
jurisdiction is appropriate within the framework of the UCCJA and the
PKPA. 125
The overarching goal in this regard, both for the UCCJA and the
PKPA, is that the court act in the best interests of the child. 126 In making
this determination, courts deciding whether a forum is inconvenient may
consider the guidelines provided in the UCCJA. 127 These guidelines
include determining: (1) whether another state is or recently was the
child's home state; (2) whether there is a closer connection between
another state and the child or the child's family; (3) whether there is
substantial information about the child's present or future care, training,
Marriage of Richardson, 625 N.W.2d 1122, 1127 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (Barry, J., specially concurring).
Courts with such concurrent jurisdiction are urged under the UCCJA to cooperate and defer to one
another to resolve custodial issues in the best interests of the child. See id. (quoting parenthetically
Wilcox v. Wilcox, 862 S.W.2d 533, 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)). But cf. Schoeffel, 644 N.E.2d at 830
(stating where two or more states have jurisdiction, the first state to exercise jurisdiction has the
exclusive right to proceed).
118. See Arulpragasam, 709 N.E.2d at 733.
119. See Wintz v. Crabtree, 1999 ND 85, 1 7, 593 N.W.2d 355, 358.
120. See id.
121. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-07 (1997) (repealed 1999); UNiF. CHLD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
ACT § 7, 9 U.L.A. 497-99 (1999).
122. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-07(1); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 7(c), 9
U.L.A. 498 (1999).
123. See Smith v. Smith, 534 N.W.2d 6, 9 (N.D. 1995) (discussing the two-pronged approach
described in Dennis v. Dennis, 387 N.W.2d 234, 235 (N.D. 1986)).
124. See Zimmerman v. Newton, 1997 ND 197, 1 8, 569 N.W.2d 700, 703.
125. See id.
126. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(D) (Supp. IV 1998) (quoted supra note 58). "In determining
whether a forum is inconvenient, the court is to give paramount consideration to the court most able to
act in the best interests of the children." Hangsleben v. Oliver, 502 N.W.2d 838, 845 (N.D. 1993).
127. See Hangsleben, 502 N.W.2d at 845.
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and relationships ih" another state; (4) whether the parties have agreed on
another appropriate forum; and (5) whether the purposes of the UCCJA
would be contravened by the exercise of jurisdiction in another state. 128
North Dakota courts have long recognized that inconvenient forum
decisions fall within the court's discretion. 129 The standard of review for
these decisions is that they will not be overturned unless the trial court
has abused its discretion.1 30 An abuse of discretion occurs when a court
has been unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable in its actions or
"when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process
leading to a reasoned determination." 131 An abuse of discretion is never
assumed, and an appellant must affirmatively establish that the trial court
abused its discretion.1 32 Nevertheless, a court's reasons for exercising its
discretion should be adequately explained to allow for meaningful
appellate review. 133
Under the UCCJA, a court should proceed to an inconvenient forum
analysis only after determining that it, in fact, has jurisdiction. 134
128. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-07(3); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 7(c), 9 U.L.A.
498 (1999).
129. See Wintz v. Crabtree, 1999 ND 85, 1 8, 593 N.W.2d 355, 358 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 534
N.W.2d 6, 10 (N.D. 1995) (holding that the trial court had jurisdiction in a custody proceeding because
North Dakota was the children's home state within six months before the beginning of the proceed-
ings, the children had significant connections to North Dakota, and California had declined jurisdiction
and had deferred the case to North Dakota as a more appropriate forum)). For a general overview of
how the North Dakota Supreme Court has addressed the issue of inconvenient forum within a child
custody context, see Luna v. Luna, 1999 ND 79, 23, 592 N.W.2d 557, 564 (holding that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in finding North Dakota was not an inconvenient forum because the
original divorce decree was rendered in North Dakota, the mother still lived in North Dakota, there
was a substantial amount of litigation involving the parties in North Dakota, and the daughter had spent
time in North Dakota); Hangsleben, 502 N.W.2d at 845 (finding North Dakota to be an inconvenient
forum because Hawaii was the child's home state prior to her presence in North Dakota, the child was
present in North Dakota only to avoid her abusive father, the child had a closer connection with
Hawaii and lived there for four years as opposed to only one year in North Dakota, neither parent
lived in North Dakota, more substantial evidence relating to the child's future care and development
was available in Hawaii, and exercise of jurisdiction in North Dakota would contravene the purpose
of the UCCJA to avoid relitigation of custody decisions in other states); and Dennis v. Dennis, 387
N.W.2d 234, 236 (N.D. 1986) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
North Dakota an inconvenient forum because Iowa was the home state of the children, substantial
evidence concerning the care, protection, training, and personal relationships of the child was more
readily available in Iowa, and Iowa had a closer connection with the children).
130. See Wintz, 8, 593 N.W.3d at 358.
131. Id.
132. See Dennis, 387 N.W.2d at 235-36 (concluding that the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in a custody modification proceeding in finding North Dakota an inconvenient forum when
North Dakota was not the home state and another state had a closer connection with the children).
133. See id. at 238 (Meschke, J., concurring).
134. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-07(1) (1997) (repealed 1999); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDIC-
TION ACT § 7, 9 U.L.A. 497-98 (1999) ("A court which has jurisdiction under this chapter ... may
decline to exercise its jurisdiction ... if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum." (emphasis added));
see also Zimmerman v. Newton, 1997 ND 197, 1 8, 569 N.W.2d 700, 703 ("[P]rocedurally, a court
must first consider whether it has jurisdiction to decide custody and, if it does, the court must then
decide ... whether to exercise its jurisdiction"); In re Marriage of Schoeffel, 644 N.E.2d 827, 831 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994) (holding that since the trial court did not have jurisdiction, the appellate court need not
[VOL. 76:697
CASE COMMENT
Nevertheless, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the incon-
venient forum issue in Wintz v. Crabtreel35 without determining if North
Dakota was the home state and had jurisdiction under the UCCJA.136
With this approach, the North Dakota Supreme Court found it unneces-
sary to render a clear decision on whether North Dakota was the home
state of the children in spite of the fact that their visit to this state
exceeded six months.137
III. ANALYSIS
After explaining the facts of the case, 138 the North Dakota Supreme
Court set out the applicable law and the method of analysis to determine
if North Dakota had jurisdiction to decide an interstate custody dis-
pute.139 The court noted that North Dakota has jurisdiction if it is the
child's home state140 but also pointed out that courts have reached
conflicting results when forced to decide whether a six-month permissive
visit to a state is sufficient to make that state the child's new home
state. 141 Rather than make this determination for North Dakota, the
court focused on the trial court's decision to decline jurisdiction after
finding North Dakota to be an inconvenient forum. 142 The court
stressed that such inconvenient forum decisions lie within the trial
court's discretion and will be overturned only where the trial court has
abused its discretion.1 43 The North Dakota Supreme Court found no
abuse of discretion in this case, and agreed with the trial court that North
Dakota was an inconvenient forum.144 The court added that exercising
jurisdiction in this case would contravene the UCCJA's purpose to pre-
vent the wrongful retention of children. 145 Finally, the court indicated
that it viewed the wrongful retention of children after visitation as an act
equivalent to an abduction. 146
discuss whether the trial court could have properly declined jurisdiction on inconvenient forum
grounds).
135. 1999 ND 85, 593 N.W.2d 355.
136. See Wintz v. Crabtree, 1999 ND 85, 7-8, 593 N.W.2d 355, 358. This is not the first
occasion where the North Dakota Supreme Court has discussed the inconvenient forum issue even
when it need not have been raised. See Hangsleben v. Oliver, 502 N.W.2d 838, 844-45 (N.D. 1993)
(finding North Dakota to be an inconvenient forum after assuming arguendo, that two other states did
not have continuing jurisdiction to modify custody).
137. See Wintz, 7, 593 N.W.2d at 358.
138. See id. IN 2-3, 593 N.w.2d at 356-57.
139. See id. 5, 593 N.W.2d at 357.
140. See id. 16.
141. See id. 7, 593 N.W.2d at 357-58.
142. See id. 7-8, 593 N.W.2d at 358.
143. See id. 8.
144. See id. T 11-12, 593 N.W.2d at 358-59.
145. See id. 12, 593 N.W.2d at 359.
146. See id.
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Before addressing the merits of jurisdictional arguments presented
by the parties, the North Dakota Supreme Court reiterated what has be-
come a well-established analysis for determining jurisdiction in interstate
custody disputes.147 In essence, a trial court must go through a multi-
step process to determine first if it has jurisdiction, and then it must con-
sider whether such jurisdiction is appropriate to exercise. 148 The court
stated that North Dakota has jurisdiction in child custody determinations
where North Dakota "is the home state of the child at the time of com-
mencement of the proceeding."1 49 The court said that home state is
defined in the statute to mean "the state in which the child immediately
preceding the time involved lived with his parents, a parent, or a person
acting as a parent, for at least six consecutive months."1 50
Although the North Dakota Supreme Court only made reference to
the home state basis for obtaining jurisdiction, the trial court acknowl-
edged the other three bases of "significant connection," emergency,
and residual jurisdiction as means of establishing jurisdiction under
chapter 14-14-03 of the North Dakota Century Code.151 The trial court
concluded that none of the bases for jurisdiction were adequate for
establishing jurisdiction in this case.152
In reviewing the district court's decision, the North Dakota Supreme
Court posed the specific question of "whether or not [the] temporary
presence in the state for more than six months under a visitation order or
by consent of the parties is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon that
147. See id. 5, 593 N.W.2d at 357.
148. See id.
149. Id. 6 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-03(1)(a) (1997) (repealed 1999)).
150. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-02(5) (1997) (repealed 1999)).
151. Under the UCCJA, jurisdiction may be assumed under (1) "home state," (2) "significant
connection," (3) emergency, or (4) residual bases. See supra text accompanying note 57.
152. See Appellant's Brief, app. at 28, Wintz v. Crabtree, 1999 ND 85, 593 N.W.2d 355 (No.
980244). As to home state jurisdiction, the trial court had reasoned that Sandra, and not Bill, had cus-
tody of the children. See id. Stating that "Arizona was the home state of the mother and the children
within 6 months prior to commencement of the proceeding," the trial court concluded that North
Dakota was not the home state of the children. Id. The trial court also briefly addressed the other
bases of significant connection, emergency and residual jurisdiction. See id. app. at 28-29, no. 8
(b)-(d). The trial court concluded that, although both Arizona and North Dakota presently have a
"significant connection" with the children and one of the parents, evidence of such a connection was
greater in Arizona. See id. The court also found "emergency" jurisdiction to be inapplicable,
because it found that the children were present in North Dakota only because Bill refused to return
them to their mother. See id. app. at 29, no. 8(c). Finally, the court concluded that Arizona would
likely have jurisdiction under the preceding bases and that Arizona had not declined to exercise its
jurisdiction. See id. at no. 8(d).
Turning to the inconvenient forum issue, the trial court determined that, under chapter 14-14-07
of the North Dakota Century Code, Arizona was the children's home state. See id. The trial court
determined that Arizona had a closer connection to the children and their mother, and that information
about the children's care was more available in Arizona. See id. Finally, the trial court added that
under North Dakota Century Code chapter 14-14-07, Bill had improperly retained the children after
their temporary stay with him. See id. at no. 9. Thus, the court also declined to exercise jurisdiction on
this basis. See id.
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state." 153 The court noted that other jurisdictions that have faced the
question have reached conflicting results. 154 Without analysis, the court
gave a brief overview of the two positions adopted by the courts that
have had to answer the question.l55
The court acknowledged that both approaches to deciding the juris-
dictional issue are supported by policy reasons. 156 After briefly setting
out the two jurisdictional views and reviewing the cases, the court said
that it need not decide the issue for itself. 157 Rather, the court posited
that even if North Dakota did have jurisdiction, the end result in this case
was the appropriate response because North Dakota is an inconvenient
forum.158
Turning to the inconvenient forum issue, the North Dakota
Supreme Court reaffirmed the discretionary role of courts in incon-
venient forum decisions.159 Such discretionary decisions are "reversed
on appeal only for an abuse of discretion."160 The court quoted the
forum non conveniens provision of the UCCJA, codified in section
14-14-07(3) of the North Dakota Century Code, which gives a deciding
court the discretion to decline jurisdiction if it finds another forum more
appropriate.161 A key feature of this provision is the requirement that
the interests of the child be considered.162
The court reviewed the record to determine if the trial court had
adequately considered the forum non conveniens factors from North
153. Wintz, 7, 593 N.W.2d at 357.
154. See id. All of the courts cited are from Illinois. See id., 593 N.W.2d at 357-58.
155. See id. One position adopts a simple home state test that asks, "Where has the child lived
with a person acting as a parent for the last six months?" In Re Marriage of Arulpragasamn and Eisele,
709 N.E.2d 725, 732 (II1. App. Ct. 1999) (finding that Illinois was the home state of the children
because they had been in the state for more than six months even though their presence was permitted
under a temporary order of a court in another state); accord In re Marriage of Schoeffel, 644 N.E.2d
827, 829-30 (I11. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that Illinois was not the home state because the children
moved to New York more than seven months before the commencement of the proceedings, hence,
New York had become the children's home state).
The other position applies a more flexible approach and takes into consideration the parent's
agreement and their intent as to whether the child's out-of-state absence of more than six months will
confer jurisdiction to the visited state. See In re Marriage of Richardson, 625 N.E.2d 1122, 1124-25
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that courts must consider not only the child's presence in the state, but also
the circumstances under which their presence occurred and holding that an 11 -month consensual visit
to Illinois was a temporary absence from the child's home state); see also In re Marriage of Frost, 681
N.E.2d 1030, 1035-36 (I11. App. Ct. 1997) (adopting the Richardson analysis and remanding the case to
determine the intent of the parents as to whether the child's absence from Illinois was temporary).
156. See Wintz, 7, 593 N.W.2d at 358.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. 18.
160. Id. An abuse of discretion is characterized by arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable
behavior or when a decision has been reached in an irrational and unreasoned manner. See id.
161. See id. 9.
162. See id. 10.
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Dakota Century Code chapter 14-14-07(3).163 Although the district
court's conclusions are limited in its explanation,164 the Memorandum
Opinion was sufficiently expressed to allow for "meaningful appellate
review." 165 The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion because it considered and applied the statutory factors of
North Dakota Century Code section 14-14-07(3).166
The court independently analyzed the inconvenient forum factors:
(1) whether another state is or recently was the child's home state, (2)
whether there was a closer connection between the child and another
state, (3) whether substantial evidence of the child's present and future
care was more readily available in another state, and (4) whether the
exercise of jurisdiction in this state would contravene any of the purpos-
es of the UCCJA.167 The court reached the conclusion that the facts in
the present case weighed in favor of jurisdiction in Arizona.168 Impor-
tant to the court was the fact that Arizona was a recent home state of the
children. 169 The court determined that the children and their mother,
with whom the children had lived exclusively except for the school year
in North Dakota, had a closer connection with Arizona.170 Also, Bill's
connection with the state had only recently come about, as he had moved
to North Dakota a short time before the children came to live with
him.171
163. See id. I 11.
164. See id. The North Dakota Supreme Court quoted the following portion of the trial court's
opinion:
I determine that North Dakota is an inconvenient forum under [North Dakota Century
Code section] 14-14-07.
a. Arizona is the present home state of the children
b. Arizona has a closer connection with the children and their mother
c. Substantial evidence concerning the children's present or future care, protection,
training and personal relationships is more readily available in Arizona[.]
Id. In his appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Bill asserted that the district court gave no sound
rationale for its finding. See Appellant's Brief at 11, Wintz (No. 980244). Bill argued that because the
children had not lived in Arizona for more than six months preceding his motion to change custody,
Arizona was not recently the children's home state. See id. at 7-8. Bill also argued that the district
court's "sparse explanation for its finding prevents meaningful appellate review," and, as such, the
district court's finding was "arbitrary and an abuse of discretion." Id. at 11.
165. Dennis v. Dennis, 387 N.W.2d 234, 238 (N.D. 1986) (Meschke, J., concurring) ("Judicial
discretion is not judicial license. Judicial discretion can only be exercised for sound reasons, not
spurious ones. And, the reasons for exercise of discretion should be sufficiently expressed, if not
readily apparent, to enable meaningful appellate review.").
166. See Wintz, 11, 593 N.W.2d at 358.
167. See id. 12, 593 N.W.2d at 358-59. The statute includes another factor-whether the par-
ties have agreed on another forum which is no less appropriate, see N.D. CErT. CODE § 14-14-
07(3)(d) (1997) (repealed 1999),-but for reasons unexplained, the supreme court did not mention or
address this factor in its opinion.
168. See id.
169. See id., 593 N.W.2d at 358.
170. See id.
171. See id., 593 N.W.2d at 358-59.
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Regarding evidence about the children's well-being, the court
found that both states could be sources for this information.1 72 However,
based on the written agreement between the parties, additional evidence
about the children's well-being would develop in Arizona.173
Finally, the court considered the main purpose for the UCCJA and
PKPA and concluded that exercising jurisdiction in North Dakota would
contravene the intent of the Act to "[d]eter abductions and other unilat-
eral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody awards."' 74
Significantly, the court viewed Bill's retention of the children beyond
what his written agreement had stipulated as the equivalent to an abduc-
tion or other unilateral removal. 175 Bill's initial custody of the children
was lawful but in the court's view, "his retention of the children beyond
the period of time agreed upon by the parties equates with child
snatching."1 76
The court went on to say that "[b]ut for Crabtree's wrongful
retention of the children, they would have returned to Arizona following
the school term." 177 Without explicitly mentioning the conduct provi-
sion, this comment appears to address chapter 14-14-08 of the North
Dakota Century Code, under which a court may decline to exercise
jurisdiction based on the "reprehensible conduct" of a party.178 The
provision refers to one who has wrongfully removed a child from
another state, but is applied equally, as in this case, where a child was
wrongfully kept within the state. 179
Although the jurisdictional question raised by Wintz was not an-
swered, the North Dakota Supreme Court asserted that the trial court's
decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction was well within its discretion
and held that the discretion of the trial court was not abused. 180 The
court added its own analysis of the statutory factors governing incon-
172. See id., 593 N.W.2d at 359 (noting that while the most recent information about the chil-
dren's care was in North Dakota, evidence of the future care of the children would develop in
Arizona).
173. See id.
174. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-01(e) (1997) (repealed 1999)).
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. This chapter is commonly referred to as the "unclean hands" provision of the UCCJA. See
Hangsleben v. Oliver, 502 N.W.2d 838, 844 (N.D. 1993). The relevant portion of North Dakota
Century Code section 14-14-08(2) states:
Unless required in the interest of the child, the court may not exercise its jurisdiction to
modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner, without consent of the person
entitled to custody, . . . has improperly retained the child after a visit or other temporary
relinquishment of physical custody.
179. See id.
180. See Wintz v. Crabtree, 1999 ND 85, 'l 8, 11, 593 N.W.2d 355, 358.
2000]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
venient forum decisions to show that the decision to decline to exercise
jurisdiction was based on sound principles that furthered the goals of the
UCCJA.181
IV. IMPACT
The impact of Wintz on future interstate custody disputes in North
Dakota may be affected by a subsequent change in the North Dakota
law. In 1999, North Dakota replaced the UCCJA with the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)182 which brings
state law into greater conformity with the PKPA.183 If Wintz had been
decided under the UCCJEA, the outcome may have been the same. 184
Perhaps the greatest potential for significant impact comes from the
court's decision not to address the jurisdictional question.185 One can
argue that by proceeding to an inconvenient forum analysis, the court
implied that it had the jurisdiction to decline. 186 Such implied jurisdic-
tion occurs in Wintz because the children were present in North Dakota
for more than six months, even though their stay was temporary. 187 It re-
mains to be seen whether parental perceptions of this decision will result
in a reluctance by custodial parents to allow their children extended
permissive visits to a non-custodial parent in North Dakota.
A. THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT
ACT
The law under which Wintz was decided was repealed and replaced
when North Dakota enacted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act in 1999.188 The UCCJEA was drafted to provide clear-
er standards for states exercising jurisdiction over child-custody deter-
minations1 89 and to bring state laws into conformity with the PKPA.190
181. See id. 12, 593 N.W.2d at 358-59.
182. See supra text accompanying note 22.
183. See Patricia M. Hoff, The ABC's of the UCCJEA: Interstate Child Custody Practice Under
the New Act, 32 FAM. L.Q. 267, 279 (1998).
184. The UCCJEA does not substantively change the definition of home state, neither does it
clarify what is meant by a temporary absence. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-12(1) (1999); UNIF.
CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 201, 9 U.L.A. 671 (1999).
185. Interview with Kelly Gaines-Stoner, Clinical Instructor, Native American Law Project,
Legal Aid Clinic, University of North Dakota School of Law, in Grand Forks, N.D. (Oct. 8, 1999).
186. See id.
187. See Wintz v. Crabtree, 1999 ND 85, 3, 593 N.W.2d 355, 357 (noting that the children had
stayed with their father in North Dakota for the entire school year).
188. See supra text accompanying note 22.
189. See Stoner, supra note 22, at 301-02. The UCCJEA defines a child-custody determination
as follows:
"Child-custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court
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The UCCJEA was also designed to bring about uniform procedures for
the enforcement of interstate child custody determinations. 191 The most
significant change made by the UCCJEA is that it gives jurisdictional
priority and exclusive continuing jurisdiction to the home state. 192
Under the UCCJEA, a state has jurisdiction to make an initial child
custody determination only if it is the home state. 193 A state may gain
jurisdiction under the other bases only if no other state qualifies as a
home state or if the true home state has declined to exercise juris-
diction. 194 Also, once a state has made a child custody determination in
conformity with the requirements for either an initial195 or modified
providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child.
The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order. The term
does not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an
individual.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-01(2) (Supp. 1999); UNriW. CHILD CUSTODY JuRISDIC'nON & ENFORCEMENT
ACT § 102(3), 9 U.L.A. 658 (1999).
190. See UNWF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 649-50
(1999). The prefatory notes explain that the 30 years following the drafting of the UCCJA were
marked by inconsistent interpretation by state courts. See id This "inconsistency of interpretation of
the UCCJA and the technicalities of applying the PKPA, resulted in a loss of uniformity among the
States." Id. at 650. This made the goals of the UCCJA unobtainable in many cases. See id
191. See id.
192. See Stoner, supra note 22, at 305. "Home state" jurisdiction has now been prioritized over
the other jurisdictional bases in the same manner as it is in the PKPA. See UNIF. CILD CUSTODY
JUISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 201 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 671-72 (1999). This eliminates the potential
conflict between the UCCJEA and the PKPA. See id.
193. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-12(1); UNIt. CHLD CUSTODY JURISDiCTON & ENFORCEMENT
ACT § 201, 9 U.L.A. 671 (1999). The definition of "home state" in the UCCJEA is slightly reworded,
but no substantive change was intended. See UNIt. C FILD CUSTODY J URISDICTION & E NFORCEMENT ACT
§ 102 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 659 (1999); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-01(6) (Supp. 1999).
194. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-12 (Supp. 1999). The UCCJEA enumerates the jurisdic-
tional bases as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in section 14-14.1-15, a court of this state has jurisdiction
to make an initial child custody determination only if:
a. This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the
proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the
commencement of the proceeding, and the child is absent from this state but a
parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state;
b. A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under subdivision a, or a court
of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground
that this state is the more appropriate forum under section 14-14.1-18 or
14-14.1-19, and:
(1) The child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent or a
person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other
than mere physical presence; and
(2) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child's care,
protection, training, and personal relationships;
c. All courts having jurisdiction under subdivision a or b have declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to
determine the custody of the child under section 14-14.1-18 or 14-14.1-19; or
d. No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in
subdivision a, b, or c.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-12(1); UNIt. CHILD CUSToDY JPUSDICnON & ENFoRCEMENT ACT § 201, 9
U.L.A. 671 (1999).
195. See id.
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child custody determination, 196 that state has exclusive continuing juris-
diction until none of the interested parties live in the state or have a
significant connection to the state. 197 Other relevant changes made by
the UCCJEA are found in its inconvenient forum provision. 198 The list
of factors that a court may consider in determining whether another state
is a more appropriate forum was expanded.199 Also, under the UCCJEA,
a state, after determining that it is an inconvenient forum, may no longer
simply dismiss the action, 200 but must stay the proceeding and direct the
parties to file in the more appropriate forum. 201
196. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-14 (Supp. 1999); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION &
ENFORCEMENT ACT § 203, 9 U.L.A. 676 (1999).
197. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-13 (Supp. 1999); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION &
ENFORCEMENT ACT § 202, 9 U.L.A. 673-74 (1999).
198. See N.D. CENT. C ODE § 14-14.1-18 (Supp. 1999); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION &
ENFORCEMENT ACT § 207, 9 U.L.A. 682-83 (1999).
199. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-18(2) (Supp. 1999); UNw. CHLD CUSTODYJURISDICTTON&
ENFORCEMENT ACT § 207(b), 9 U.L.A. 682 (1999). The UCCJEA's expanded list of factors for
determining whether a forum is inconvenient states:
2. Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this state shall
consider whether it is appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction.
For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to submit information and shall
consider all relevant factors, including:
a. Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and
which state could best protect the parties and the child;
b. The length of time the child has resided outside this state;
c. The distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would
assume jurisdiction;
d. The relative financial circumstances of the parties;
e. Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;
f. The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation,
including testimony of the child;
g. The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the
procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
h. The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending
litigation.
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 207 (b), 9 U.L.A. 682 (1999). "The list is
not meant to be exclusive." Id.
200. See Hoff, supra note 183, at 285. "To do so would leave the case in limbo." UNIF. CHILD
CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 207 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 683 (1999).
201. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-18(3) (Supp. 1999); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION &
ENFORCEMENT ACT § 207(c), 9 U.L.A. 682-83 (1999). Certainly, other modifications were effected by
the UCCJEA but are beyond the scope of this comment. For more detailed coverage of substantive
changes brought about by the UCCJEA, see UNrI. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT
prefatory notes, 9 U.L.A. 649-53 (1999); Stoner, supra note 22; and Hoff, supra note 183.
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B. WimTz v. CRABTREE REVISITED
The North Dakota Supreme Court left unanswered the question of
whether or not a child's permissive temporary presence of more than six
months in the state is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the state;202
the question remains unanswered. This raises the question whether the
Wintz outcome would be significantly different under the new law. The
UCCJEA gives priority to home state jurisdiction, necessitating a deter-
mination of which state holds that position. 203 The definition of home
state has not substantially changed and the drafters have not further
defined the scope of a "temporary absence." 204 Therefore, had Wintz
been decided under the UCCJEA, the court may still have chosen to
leave the jurisdictional question unanswered.
C. POSSIBLE UNINTENDED RESULTS OF DECLINING TO ANSWER THE
JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION
The court's decision to not answer this jurisdictional question may
have unintended results. On other occasions, the North Dakota Supreme
Court has chosen not to decide similar questions. 205 In Zimmerman v.
Newton, 206 rather than addressing the question of whether jurisdiction
existed, the trial court assumed that jurisdiction existed and declined to
exercise that jurisdiction because a custody proceeding was pending in
another state.207 On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court also
assumed, without deciding, that the state had jurisdiction under section
14-14-03 of the North Dakota Century Code208 and considered only
whether the court incorrectly declined to exercise jurisdiction under the
"simultaneous proceedings" provision of the UCCJA.209 In Wintz, the
202. See Wintz v. Crabtree, 1999 ND 85, 7, 593 N.W.2d 355, 358.
203. This change merely brings the UCCJA in conformity with the priority already established
under the PKPA. Arguably, where state law conflicts with federal law, the federal law will super-
sede. See Hangsleben v. Oliver, 502 N.W.2d 838, 844 (N.D. 1993) (stating that North Dakota was
preempted by the PKPA from exercising its home state jurisdiction where other states could validly
exercise continuing jurisdiction under PKPA and had not declined to do so). Hence, firmly
establishing which state is the "home state" is not a new requirement.
204. See UMNF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIsDICION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 102 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 659
(1999); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-01(6) (Supp. 1999).
205. See Zimmerman v. Newton, 1999 ND 197, 9, 569 N.W.2d 700, 704 (stating that the court
would assume that North Dakota had jurisdiction without actually deciding the issue). In Hangsleben
the court said that it need not determine a continuing jurisdiction question. See Hangsleben, 502
N.w.2d at 844.
206. 1999 ND 197, 569 N.W.2d 700.
207. See Zimmerman, 9, 569 N.W.2d at 704.
208. See id.
209. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-06 (1997) (repealed 1999); see also Zimmerman, 9, 569
N.W.2d at 704. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that a home state or significant connection
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court declined to decide whether a six-month permissive temporary pres-
ence in North Dakota was sufficient to confer home state jurisdiction. 210
However, it could be argued that by proceeding to the inconvenient
forum question, the court assumed that the jurisdiction was there to
decline.2 11
The implications resulting from this assumption in Wintz are further
reaching than they were in Zimmerman.212 By assuming that North
Dakota had jurisdiction in Wintz, the court implied its assent to the posi-
tion furthered by the Richardson special concurrence-that a permissive
six-month presence of a child in the state is sufficient to establish home
state jurisdiction.213 Therefore, the related policy concerns raised by the
Richardson majority, in opposition to the "simple 'home state' test," 214
must be considered. For example, the Wintz decision may have a chill-
ing effect on the creation of extended visitation agreements if the
custodial parent realizes that a new home state for the child may be
established if the visit exceeds six months. 215 If jurisdiction is, in fact,
established on this basis, the court may exercise its discretion to ensure
that the proceeding takes place in the more appropriate forum. 216 How-
ever, courts are often reluctant to relinquish control over the custodial
determinations of a child who is physically before the court and where,
by this time, substantial information about the child's care and well
being has been developed. 217
Another possible implication of the court's refusal to decide the
jurisdictional issue in Wintz, is that it expands the trial court's discretion-
ary role. If trial courts assume they have jurisdiction in order to decide
the issue on inconvenient forum grounds, which is a discretionary
determination needed to be made, because "an affirmative answer to either question would not affect
[the] appeal." Id.
210. See Wintz v. Crabtree, 1999 ND 85, 593 N.W.2d 355, 357-58.
211. See In re Marriage of Richardson, 625 N.E.2d 1122, 1129 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (Barry, J.,
specially concurring) (citing In re McDonald, 253 N.W.2d 678, 681 n.7 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977)). "The
trial court failed to rule expressly on whether Michigan has jurisdiction. By declining to exercise
jurisdiction, however, the circuit court implicitly held that it had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute."
McDonald, 253 N.W.2d at 681 n.7.
212. The assumption of jurisdiction by the Zimmerman court did not effect the outcome of that
case. See Zimmerman, 9, 569 N.W.2d at 704. By the same token, an assumption of jurisdiction in
the Wintz case does not change the outcome of the case, but it raises the inference that a simple,
six-month presence in the state is all that is needed to establish "home state" jurisdiction.
213. See Richardson, 625 N.E.2d at 1127-28 (Barry, J., specially concurring).
214. See id. at 1124-25 (stating that applying a strict physical presence analysis would create new
"home state" jurisdiction for any extended visit over six months and would discourage extended
visitation agreements by divorced parents living in different states).
215. See id.; see also In re Marriage of Frost, 681 N.E.2d 1030, 1035 (!11. App, Ct. 1997).
216. See Richardson, 625 N.E.2d at 1128 (Barry, J., specially concurring).
217. For example, although it ultimately decided that the children had a greater connection to Ari-
zona, the trial court in Wintz admitted that, "there is available substantial evidence concerning the
children's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships in either State."
Appellant's Brief, app. at 28, Wintz v. Crabtree, 1999 ND 85, 593 N.W.2d 355 (No. 980244)
(emphasis added).
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determination, a degree of the uniformity sought by the enactment of
uniform acts is lost.218 While this increase of the trial court's discretion
may seem to foster more just decisions on a case-by-case basis, one can
argue that it undermines the goal of uniformity sought by the enactment
of the UCCJA, the UCCJEA and the PKPA.219
Because we are an increasingly mobile society, and particularly
because North Dakota is home to two United States Air Force bases, it is
likely that interstate custody disputes arising out of six-month or longer
visitations will again surface. For the benefit of interstate families
separated by divorce, the scope of "temporary absence," and whether it
includes a six-month permissive visit, should be determined.
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218. See Wintz, 8, 593 N.W.2d at 358.
219. Interview with Marcia O'Kelly, Professor, University of North Dakota School of Law, in
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